This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy pro…le are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in speci…c submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.
Introduction
Intuitively a cooperative equilibrium is a collective decision adopted by a group of individuals that can be viewed as stable (i.e., an equilibrium) against all feasible deviations by single individuals or by proper subgroups. While modelling the possibilities of cooperation may not pose the social scientist particular problems, at least once an appropriate economic or social situation is clearly outlined, the de…nition of stability may be a more demanding task for the modeler. This because the outcome, and the pro…tability, of players' deviations heavily depends on the conjectures they make over the reaction of other players. As an example, a neighborhood rule to keep a common garden clean possesses di¤erent stability properties whether the conjectured reactions in the event of shirking is, in turn, that the garden would be kept clean anyway or, say, that the common garden would be abandoned as a result. Similarly, countries participating to an international environmental agreement will possess di¤erent incentive to comply with the prescribed pollution abatements whether defecting countries expect the other partners to be inactive or to retaliate.
The main focus of the present paper are cooperative equilibria of games in strategic form. A cooperative equilibrium of a game in strategic form can be de…ned as a strategy pro…le such that no subgroup of players can "make e¤ective" -by means of alternative strategy pro…lesutility levels higher for its members than those obtained at the equilibrium. As expressed in the example above, the content of the equilibrium concept depends very much on the utility levels that each coalition can potentially make e¤ective and this, in turn, depends on the conjectures over the reactions induced by deviations. In this paper we propose a cooperative equilibrium for games in strategic form, based on the assumption that players deviating from an arbitrary strategy pro…le have non zero conjectures on the reaction of the remaining players. More precisely, the conjectural cooperative equilibrium we propose assumes that the remaining players are expected to optimally and independently react according to their best response map.
Related literature
The problem of de…ning cooperative equilibrium concepts have been centered on the formulation of conjectures ever since the pioneering work of von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) . The concepts of and core, formally studied by Aumann (1967) , are based on their early proposal of representing the worth of a coalition as the aggregate payo¤ that it can guarantee its members in the game being played. Formally obtained as the minmax and maxmin payo¤ imputations for the coalition in the game played against its complement, the and charac-teristic functions express the behaviour of extremely risk averse coalitions, acting as if they expected their rivals to minimize their payo¤. Although ful…lling a rationality requirement in zero sum games, and -assumptions do not seem justi…able in most economic settings. Moreover, the little pro…tability of coalitional objections usually yield very large set of solutions (e.g., large cores). Another important cooperative equilibrium proposed by Aumann (1959) , denoted Strong Nash Equilibrium, extends the Nash Equilibrium assumption of "zero conjectures" to every coalitional deviation. Accordingly, a Strong Nash Equilibrium is de-…ned as a strategy pro…le that no group of players can pro…tably object, given that remaining players are expected not to change their strategies. Strong Nash Equilibria are at the same time Pareto optima and Nash Equilibria; in addition they satisfy the Nash stability requirement for each possible coalition. As a consequence, the set of Strong Nash Equilibria is often empty, preventing the use of this otherwise appealing concept in most economic problems of strategic interaction.
Other approaches have looked at the choice of forming coalitions as a strategy in well de…ned games of coalition formation (see Bloch (1997) for a survey). Among others, the gamma and delta games in Hart and Kurz (1985) constitute a seminal contribution. 1 The gamma game, in particular, is related to the present analysis, since it predicts that if the grand coalition N is objected by a subcoalition S, the complementary set of players splits and act as a noncooperative fringe. On the same behavioural assumption is based the concept of core, introduced by Chander and Tulkens (1997) in the analysis of environmental agreements, where a characteristic function is obtained as the Nash equilibrium between the forming coalition and all individual players in its complement. As in the present approach, based on deviations in the underlying strategic form game, the core assumes that the forming coalition expects outside players to move along their (individual) reaction functions. Di¤erently from our approach, however, there the forming coalition forms before choosing its Nash equilibrium strategy in the game against its rivals, while here deviating coalitions directly switch to new strategies in the underlying game, expecting their rivals to react in the same manner as followers in a Stackelberg game. In applying our concept to the analysis of stability of environmental coalitions, we may interpret these di¤erences as the description of di¤erent structures in the process of deviation. While the core seems to describe settings in which the formation of a deviating coalition is publicly observed before the choice of strategies, our approach best …ts situations in which deviating coalitions can implement their new strategies before their formation is monitored, enjoying a positional advantage.
The conjectural cooperative equilibrium we propose in this paper, by assuming that remaining players are expected to optimally react according to their best response map, introduces a very natural rationality requirement in the equilibrium concept. Moreover, the coalitional incentives to object are considerably weakened with respect to the Strong Nash Equilibrium, thus ensuring the existence of a cooperative conjectural equilibrium in all symmetric games in which players' actions are strategic complements in the sense of Bulow et al. (1985) , i.e., in all supermodular games (see Topkis (1998) ).
An example of a conjectural cooperative equilibrium
Before formally de…ning the conjectural cooperative equilibrium, it is easy to introduce the mechanics at works for the existence of such an equilibrium by means of the following 3x3 bi-matrix game. Suppose, in the game above, that (b; b) is an e¢cient outcome, i.e, such to maximize the sum of players' payo¤. To be a cooperative equilibrium, the outcome (b; b) has to be immune from either player switching her own strategy, given their expectation that the rival would optimally react to the switch. When players actions are strategic substitutes (and the game submodular), each player's reaction map is downward sloped, implying that any move from (b; b) by one player would generate a predicted outcome on the asymmetric diagonal of the matrix. If we let, in the example, a > b > c > h, and b > a+c 2 , then the e¢cient outcome (b; b) will not certainly be a conjectural cooperative equilibrium, for player 1 will pro…tably deviate from it (from B to A), conjecturing that her rival's best reply will go in the opposite direction (from B to C), and getting a payo¤ of a > b. The same will happen if c > b > a > e, in which case player 2 deviates by switching from B to C. In contrast, suppose that the game above is supermodular, with the associated increasing reaction maps. In this case, the conjectured outcomes in case of deviations from outcome (b; b) are only (x; x) and (y; y). As a result, if either player …nds it pro…table to switch either to A or to C (with x > b and y > b, respectively) then the assumption that (b; b) is an e¢cient outcome is contradicted. We can conclude that (b; b) is a conjectural cooperative equilibrium of the symmetric game described above whenever supermodularity holds. Note that in our example, if d > b, the e¢cient outcome (b; b) is a conjectural cooperative equilibrium although it is neither a Strong Nash Equilibrium nor a Nash Equilibrium. 2 The above example, although providing a clear insight of how both supermodularity and symmetry work in favour of the existence of an equilibrium, contains two substantial simpli…cations: the presence of only two players, ruling out existence problems related to the formation of coalitions, as well as the restriction to 3 strategies, thus forcing the increasing best replies to generate symmetric outcomes, from which, the fact that (B,B) is an equilibrium, directly follows. However, in the paper we are able to show that the existence result holds for any number of players and strategies, provided a symmetry assumption on the e¤ect of players' own strategies on the payo¤ of rivals is ful…lled.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduce the conjectural cooperative equilibrium in the standard setup of strategic form games. Section 3 presents the main paper result: for a well de…ned class of games, symmetric supermodular games, a conjectural cooperative equilibrium always exists. Section 4 discusses in detail the meaning of this result and presents a descriptive example of an environmental economy whose cooperative conjectural equilibrium exists depending on individuals' preferences. Section 5 concludes.
Set Up
We consider a game in strategic form G = N; (X i ; u i ) i2N , in which N = f1; :::; i; :::; ng is the set of players, X i is the set of strategies for player i, with generic element x i , and u i : X 1 ::: X n ! R + is the payo¤ function of player i. We denote by S N any coalition of players, and by S its complement with respect to N . For each coalition S, we denote by x S 2 X S Q i2S X i a pro…le of strategies for the players in S, and use the notation X = X N and x = x N . A Pareto Optimum (PO) for G is a strategy pro…le such that there exists no alternative pro…le which is preferred by all players to and strictly preferred by at least one player. The Pareto Optimum x e is e¢cient if it maximizes the sum of the payo¤s of all players in N . In the example discussed in the above introduction, letting outcomes be ordered as follows: a > b > c > d > e > h > x > y, and assuming that b > a+c 2 , the pro…les (a; c), (c; a) and (b; b) are all Pareto Optima, while the e¢cient pro…le is (b; b).
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) for G is de…ned as a strategy pro…le x 2 X N such that no player has an incentive to change his own strategy, i.e., such that there exists no i 2 N and
Nash equilibria are stable with respect to individual deviations, given that the e¤ect of such deviations is evaluated keeping the strategies played by the other players …xed at the equilibrium levels.
In trying to formulate equilibrium concepts that allow coalitions of players to coordinate in the choice of their strategies, a natural extension of the Nash equilibrium is given by the concept of Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE), a strategy pro…le that no coalition of players can improve upon given that the e¤ect of deviations is, again, evaluated keeping the strategies of other players …xed at the equilibrium levels. So,x 2 X N is a SNE for G if there exists no
Obviously, all SNE of G are both Nash Equilibria and Pareto Optima. As a result, SNE fails to exist in many economic problems, and in particular, whenever Nash Equilibria fail to be Optimal. Although the lack of existence of SNE can be interpreted as a poor speci…cation of the game theoretic model, it precludes the use of this otherwise appealing concept of a cooperative equilibrium in many important applications. In this paper we propose a concept of cooperative equilibrium for G based on the introduction of non-zero conjectures in the evaluation of the pro…tability of coalitional deviations. The concept we propose captures the idea that players outside a deviating coalition are expected to react by making optimal choices (contingent on the strategy pro…le played in the deviation) as independent and noncooperative players. In order to describe the conjectured optimizing reactions of players outside a deviating coalition S, let us de…ne …rst the restricted game G(x S ) obtained from G by considering the restricted set of players S, and parameterizing payo¤s by letting each j in S obtain the payo¤ u j (x S ; x S ) out of the pro…le x S , for each x S 2 X S . We denote by R S : X S ! X S the map associating with each joint strategy x S of coalition S the set R S (x S ) of Nash Equilibria of the restricted game G(x S ). The set R S (x S ) describes the conjecture of coalition S on the possible reactions of players in S to the choice of the joint strategy x S .
such that there exists no coalition S, strategy pro…les x S 2 X S and x S 2 R S (x S ) such that:
So de…ned, a CCE satis…es very restrictive stability requirements. According to de…nition 1, any coalition S can look for improvements upon any proposed strategy pro…le by selecting among its feasible joint pro…les x S 2 X S and, for each possible x S it may choose, by selecting among all the Nash responses of players in S (formally, the set R S ) the most pro…table strategy x S . De…nition 1 is indeed well de…ned both when the set R S (x S ) may be empty for some (possibly all) x S 2 X S , and when the set R S (x S ) is multivalued for some (possibly all) x S 2 X S . In this sense, it applies to all games in strategic form. This generality comes at the price of the arguably unreasonable assumption that a deviating coalition faces no constraint in selecting among the possibly non unique reactions of outside players. A more realistic approach would assume that a deviating coalition should form expectations about which equilibrium reaction would be played by outside players, and that these expectations should be based on some sort of rationality requirement on the behaviour of such outside players. We remark, however, that the present approach generates a smaller set of equilibria than would result from any arbitrary selection from the set of Nash responses of outside players. Our result of existence of a CCE in all supermodular games, contained in theorem 1 in section 3.3, would therefore extend to any equilibrium concept associated with the choice of such a selection. In addition, lemmas 7-10 show that the present de…nition generates the same set of equilibria that would result from the selection of the Pareto dominant element of the set R S (x S ). Since the existence of such elements is not generally ensured, but always holds on the class of symmetric supermodular games for which our result is obtained (see section 3.1 for de…nitions), we have chosen to present de…nition 1 in its present, and more general, form.
Supermodularity
We start by de…ning the concept of a supermodular function and by recording some results in the theory of supermodularity that will be used in the analysis of the next section. For a partially ordered set A R n and any pair of elements x; y of A, we de…ne the join element (x^y) and the meet element (x _ y) as follows:
(x^y) = (min fx 1 ; y 1 g ; :::; min fx n ; y n g) ; (x _ y) = (max fx 1 ; y 1 g ; :::; max fx n ; y n g) :
Increasing di¤erences describe a complementarity property of the function f , whose marginal increase with respect to y is increasing in x. If A is the Cartesian product of partially ordered sets, then the fact that f is supermodular on A implies that f has increasing difference in all pairs of sets among those whose product originates A (see Topkis (1998) for a formal statement and proof of this fact).
De…nition 5
The game in strategic form G = N; (X i ; u i ) i2N is supermodular if the set X of feasible joint strategies for N is a sublattice of R n , if the payo¤ functions u i (x i ; x i ) is supermodular in x i and has increasing di¤erences in (x i ; x i ) on X i X i .
We will extensively exploit two properties of supermodular games, related to the existence of a Nash Equilibrium and to the behaviour of the set of Nash equilibria in response to changes in a …xed parameter on which these equilibria depend. We recall these properties below, and refer to Topkis (1998) for proofs.
be a supermodular game, with X nonempty and compact and u i upper hemicontinuous in x i for all i. Then the set of Nash equilibria of G is nonempty and admits a greatest and least element.
be a set of supermodular games, parameterized by t, with T being a partially ordered set. Let the assumptions of Lemma 1 hold. Then the greatest and least elements of the set of Nash equilibria of G are non decreasing in t on T .
Assumptions and preliminary results
We impose the following lattice structure and continuity assumptions on our game in strategic form.
Assumption 1 X i is a compact sublattice of R, for all i 2 N .
Assumption 2 u i is continuous and supermodular in x i on X i for each x i 2 X i , and exhibits increasing di¤erences on X i X i .
Our requirement of continuity of u i is unnecessarily strong for the establishment of existence and monotonicity of Nash equilibria in the next lemmas. However, we will need such assumption to ensure the existence of a strategy pro…le with certain properties in X as a step towards the proof of theorem 1 (see lemma 9). In addition to assumptions 1 and 2, we impose two symmetry requirements on G. Assumption 3 requires that players payo¤s are neutral to switches in the strategies played by other players, and that pairwise switches in strategies are mirrored by pairwise switches in payo¤s. In other words, only strategies matter, and not who plays them. Assumption 4 requires that the e¤ect of a change in other players' strategies on one's own payo¤ is monotonic, and its sign is the same for all players. Many well known games (including Cournot, Betrand and public good games) satisfy this symmetry assumption. The next results directly follow from an applications to our game G of the properties of supermodular games listed in lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 3 Let assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For all x S 2 X S , the set of Nash equilibria R S (x S ) is nonempty and has a greatest and a least element.
Proof 1 Application of lemma 1.
Let r g S and r l S the selections of the map R S obtained by considering its greatest and least element, respectively.
Lemma 4 Let assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The maps r u S and r l S are non decreasing in x S .
Proof 2 Application of lemma 2.
We …nally make use of the symmetry assumptions 3 and 4 to show that the set R S (x S ) is Pareto ranked.
Lemma 5 Let assumptions 1-4 hold. If the payo¤ functions exhibit positive (negative) externalities, then for all x S the element r g S (x S ) (r l S (x S )) Pareto dominates all other elements in R S on the set of players S.
Let externalities be positive. The following inequality follows:
The …rst inequality is due to the Nash equilibrium property of x 0 S for the restricted game G(x S ). The second inequality is due to positive externalities. Since the argument applies to all j in S and for all x S 2 R S (x S ), the result follows. The proof for the case of negative externalities is similar and is omitted.
Results
This section contains our main result: all games satisfying assumptions 1-4 admit a Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium. The proof of theorem 1 is constructive: we show that every e¢cient symmetric strategy pro…le in X N satis…es the conditions for being a CCE. Before proving this fact in theorem 1, we establish a few preliminary results. We …rst show that an e¢ciency symmetric strategy pro…le always exists under assumptions 1-4.
Lemma 6
Let G satisfy assumption 1-4. Then there exists an e¢cient strategy pro…le x e 2 X N such that x e i = x e j for all i; j 2 N:
Proof 4 Compactness of each X i implies compactness of X. Continuity of each u i implies continuity of the social payo¤ function u N = P i2N u i . Existence of an e¢cient pro…le directly follows from Weiestrass theorem. To show that there exists a symmetric e¢cient pro…le, we need to exploit the supermodularity properties of payo¤ functions. Consider any arbitrary asymmetric pro…le x, with x i 6 = x j for some players i and j. By the symmetry assumption on payo¤ functions, we write
where we have used the convention of writing the strategies of players i and j as …rst and second elements of x, respectively. Since the sum of supermodular functions is itself supermodular, assumptions 1 and 2 imply:
It follows that either
or both. Suppose that (3) holds, and let x 0 = x i ; x i ; x N nfi[jg . This is without loss of generality for the ongoing argument. If x k = x i for all k 2 N n fi [ jg our proof is complete. If not, then let x k 6 = x i . In this case, again by supermodularity of payo¤ functions, we write
Condition (5) implies, again, that either (7) or both. Suppose …rst that only (7) holds. Using the de…nition of x 0 we obtain
For this case, using again supermodularity, we write
Using (8) and (9) we obtain that
Conditions (8) and (10) directly imply
We have therefore shown that either (6) or (9) must hold. By iteration of the same operation for each additional player in N n fi [ j [ kg, we obtain the conclusion that there exists some symmetric pro…le x s for which u N (x s ) u N (x). Since the starting pro…le x was arbitrary, and by the existence of an e¢cient pro…le proved in the …rst part of this proof, we conclude that a symmetric e¢cient pro…le x e always exists under assumptions 1-4.
We now consider the possible joint strategies that an arbitrary coalition S can use in order to improve upon an e¢cient pro…le x e . In particular, we focus on the "best" strategies S can adopt, by this meaning the pro…les x (S) 2 X N satisfying the two following properties:
for at least one h 2 S. In words, x (S) is a Pareto optimal pro…le for coalition S in the set F (S) of all pro…les that are consistent with the reaction map R S :
Note that F (S) is a compact set by the compactness of X N and by the closedness of the Nash correspondence R S (x S ).
Lemma 7 Let G satisfy assumptions 1-4. Then for all x 0 2 F (S) there exists some pro…le x (S) 2 X N which is a best strategy for S in the sense of conditions i) and ii) above and such that u i (x (S)) u i (x 0 ) for all i 2 S.
Proof 5 Let x 0 2 F (S). If x 0 = x (S) for some x (S) then the lemma is proved for x 0 . If x 0 6 = x (S) for all x (S), then let the set
de…ne the set of strategy pro…les that are weakly preferred by player i to x 0 . The set P i (x 0 ) is nonempty by the fact that x 0 6 = x (S) for all x (S), and it is closed and bounded by continuity of u i and by compactness of F (S). Since this holds for all i 2 S, it follows that the set P S (x 0 ) = \ i2S P i (x 0 ) is closed and bounded. 3 Moreover, it is non empty because x 0 6 = x (S). We can therefore conclude that the problem
has a solution for all in the interior of the #S 1 dimensional unitary simplex. Call x( ) such a solution. Clearly, x( ) satis…es conditions i) and ii) de…ning the pro…le x (S). Also, clearly x( ) Pareto dominates x 0 on the set of players S, which concludes the proof.
By lemma 7, we can restrict our analysis to the "best" choices x (S) of coalition S, since if S cannot pro…tably deviate by any such pro…les, it cannot deviate by means of any pro…le in F (S). We remark here that in the choice of a "best" pro…le x (S), coalition S is assumed able to select among all the possible (equilibrium) reactions of S, as speci…ed by R S , in order to maximize its joint payo¤. This is in line with our de…nition of a CCE, in which this ability of S was implicitly assumed. The next lemma shows that under assumptions 3 and 4 the best choice of S always selects strategies for S that are greater (least) elements of the set R S (x S ), depending on the sign of the externality being positive or negative, respectively.
Lemma 8 Let G satisfy positive (negative) externalities. Let S
N and x 0 2 F (S).
Proof 6
We show only the case of positive externalities; the proof for negative externalities is symmetric and left to the reader. Since r g
The implications of lemmas 7 and 8 are better illustrated by referring to the sets F g (S)
F (S) and F l F (S), de…ned as follows:
Lemmas 8 implies that, under positive externalities, the same strategy pro…le x (S), maximizing (by lemma 7) the aggregate payo¤ of S over the set F (S) for some vector of weights , also maximizes the same aggregate payo¤ over the set F g (S). The same conclusion can be drawn, with respect to the set F l (S), for the case of negative externalities. This result is important for two reasons. First, it endows the somewhat problematic assumption that S can select among Nash reactions of players in S -which, as we said, is implicit in the de…nition of a CCE and of the set F (S) above -with the more appealing interpretation that the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium will be played by members of S. This interpretation is supported by the result of Lemma 5, by which the greater and least elements of R S (x 0 S ) are the best choices for S under positive and negative externalities, respectively. Second, the result of lemma 8 allows us to exploit the properties of the maps r g S (x S ) and r l S (x S ) in supermodular games. This is done in the next lemma, in which these properties are shown to imply that at x (S) the strategies played by members of S and of S are ordered according to the sign of the externality: under positive externalities, players in S play "greater" strategies than those in S, while the opposite is true under negative externalities.
Lemma 9 Let i 2 S and j 2 S, and denote by x 2 X and y 2 X the strategies of player i 2 S and player j 2 S, respectively, at x (S). Then: i) positive externalities imply x y; ii) negative externalities imply y x.
Proof 7 For simplicity of notation, let x denote the pro…le x (S). Let U i (x; y) u i x Sni ; x; x N nSnj ; y , and similarly let U j (x; y) = u j x Sni ; x; x N nSnj ; y . We use supermodularity of u i to write:
By the properties of x ,
implying by symmetry that
Using (12) and (14) we obtain
Now suppose that y > x and assume that the game has positive externalities. By lemma 4, the equilibrium best response map has non decreasing greatest element, so that y > x ) r g S (x Sni ; y) r g S (x S ) = x S : 
Both 18 and 19 contradict the assumption that x is a Pareto Optimum. Suppose now that y < x and assume that the game has negative externalities. Supermodularity of u i and u j imply
By negative externalities u i (x Sni ; y; r l S (x Sni ; y)) u i (x Sni ; y; r l S (x S )) = U i (y; y):
Again, equation (22) imply
and, by negative externalities,
for every k 2 Sni, a contradiction.
Since by lemma 7 we can restrict our attention to the pro…les x (S), we will use the above result as a characterizing of the strategies played in the only relevant pro…les that may be used in any deviation from an e¢ciency pro…le x e . The next result makes use of this characterization to prove that at any pro…le x (S), the members of S cannot be better o¤ than the members of S. This result generalizes to the present setting of coalitional actions a well known property of the subgame perfect equilibrium in two player symmetric supermodular games, in which the "leader" is weakly worse o¤ than the "follower".
Lemma 10 Let i 2 S and j 2 S. Then u j (x (S)) u i (x (S)).
Proof 8 For simplicity, let again x denote the pro…le x (S). The following inequalities hold:
The …rst part is implied by the conditions de…ning the pro…le x ; the second part follows from lemma 9 and assumption 4. By assumption 3, we also have
Inequalities (24) and (25) imply
which proves the result.
We are now ready to show that an e¢cient strategy pro…le x e satis…es the requirements of a Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium.
Theorem 1 Let the game G satisfy assumption 1-4. Then, G admits a conjectural cooperative equilibrium.
Proof 9 Let x e be a symmetric e¢cient strategy pro…le for G, that is, a symmetric strategy pro…le that maximizes the aggregate payo¤ of N . Let u(x e ) denote the payo¤ of each agent at x e . Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a coalition S N such that for all i 2 S:
with strict inequality for at least one h 2 S. Note that by lemma 10, it must be that 
We conclude that if u i (x (S)) u(x e ) for all i 2 S, with strict inequality for at least one h 2 S, then using (26) and (28), we obtain
which contradicts the e¢ciency of x e .
On the Existence of Equilibria in Submodular Games

The Role of the Slope of the Reaction Map
Theorem 1 establishes su¢cient conditions for the existence of a conjectural cooperative equilibrium of the game G. The crucial condition, strategic complementarity in the sense of Bulow et al. (1985) , generates non decreasing best replies; in particular, the supermodularity of payo¤ functions implies that the Nash responses of players outside a deviating coalition are a non decreasing function of the strategies of coalitional members. This feature ensures that each players outside S is better o¤ than each coalitional member of S when deviating. Deviations by proper subcoalitions of players are therefore little pro…table, while the grand coalition, not a¤ected by this "deviator's curse", produces a su¢ciently big aggregate payo¤ for a stable cooperative outcomes to exist. In this section we show how the same mechanics responsible for our existence result on the class of supermodular games, provide useful insight for the analysis of games with strategic substitutes, as, for instance, environmental and public goods games. We will use as an illustration an environmental Cobb-Douglas economy to show that as long as best replies are not "too" decreasing (thereby providing deviating coalitions with a not "too" big positional advantage), stable cooperative outcomes exist.
An illustration using a Cobb-Douglas environmental economy
We consider an economy with set of agents N = f1; ::i; ::; ng, in which z 0 is the environmental quality enjoyed by agents, x i 0 is a private good, p i 0 is a polluting emission originated as a by-product of the production of x i . We assume that for each i in N preferences are represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function
technology is described by the production function
and emissions accumulate according to the additive law
where A is a constant expressing the quality of a pollution-free environment. We will assume that ; and are all positive and 1. We associate with this economy the game G e with players set N , strategy space 0; p 0 i for each i, with P i2N p 0 i < A, and payo¤s U i (p 1 ; :::; p n ) = z p i , where = . Using this (symmetric) setup, we can express the maximal per-capita payo¤ of each coalition S in the event of a deviation from an arbitrary strategy pro…le in G as follows:
This simple setup of an environmental economy can be used to illustrate how CCE exist when best replies are not too decreasing or, in other terms, when strategies are not too substitute. This in turn requires that players' utilities does not decrease too much with other players' choice, a property mainly depending on the level of log-concavity of the term z (p) . We prove this analytically for the case = 1, while we rely on numerical simulation for the general case. Note that z (p) is log-concave (and the game is not log-supermodular) for > 0, and best replies are decreasing. The environmental game admits a unique Nash equilibrium p with p i = A +n for every i 2 N , and a unique e¢cient pro…le p e (by e¢cient we mean "aggregate welfare maximizer"). Simple algebra yields the following expression:
The pro…tability of individual deviation from the e¢cient strategy pro…le p e is evaluated as follows:
u i (p e ) u i (S) = ( + n 1) n 1 < 0 , < 1:
It follows that when the function z(p) is strictly concave ( < 1), then no CCE exists. However, when = 1, the CCE is unique, and equal to p e . It is also easy to show that for > 1 (z(:) convex ) the strategy pro…le p e is still a CCE. We conclude that the existence of a CCE only requires a not too strong log-concavity of z(:) . This ensures that the marginal utility of each consumer does not decrease too much with the rivals' private consumption and hence, a deviating coalition, by expanding its pollution (and private consumption) does not exploit too much its advantage against complementary players. When this is the case, although the environmental game is a natural "strategic substitute" game, the CCE exists. It is interesting to relate the existence of a stable cooperative (and e¢cient) solution with the relative magnitude of the parameters , and , expressing the intensity of preferences for the environment and for private consumption, and the characteristics of technology. It turns out that in order for an agreement on emissions to be reached, agents must put enough weight on the environment in their preferences (high enough ), and emissions must not be too "productive" according to the available technology. In other words, this conclusion rephrases the common intuition that a clean environment is sustainable only if agents care enough for ambient quality. As we said, the analysis of existence of a CCE for the general case (that is, removing the assumption = 1) is not possible in analytical terms. In what follows we show by means of computations that the set of CCEa of the game e can be characterized with respect to three possible con…gurations of the parameter ; and of the economy: the case = , in which the CCE is unique and assigning to each player the payo¤ u i (p e ) (for this case we provide an analytical proof); the case > , in which the set of CCEa strictly includes the pro…le p e ; the case < , in which the set of CCE is empty. To show that p e is a CCE, it su¢ces to show that u i (S) u i (p e ) for all coalitions S such that s > 1. Using 32 we obtain u i (p e ) u i (S) 0 () h s ( + (n s)) n i 0 which, using again the fact that = reduces to u i (p e ) u i (S) 0 () [s ( + (n s))] ( n) .
The last condition can be rewritten as u i (p e ) u i (S) 0 () s + (n s) s + s 2 n + s 2 which is always satis…ed since s 1.
Proposition 2 If > then p e is a CCE.
Proof 11 We proceed by numerical simulations. Our aim is to show that whenever > the di¤erence u i (p e ) u i (S) is positive for every s. We …rst consider the case s = 1. We plot the graph of f i ( ; n) max f(u i (p e ) u i (fig)) ; 0g
for the …xed value of = 0:5. The domains are taken to be (1; 10000) for n and (0; 1) for .From Figure 1 it is evident that u i (p e ) > u i (fig) whenever > 0:5 = . Similar graph are obtained for other values of in the range (0; 1). We perform the same exercise for coalition of size s > 1. We plot the function f ( ; s) max f(u i (p e ) u i (fSg)) ; 0g
for …x values of n and . The domains are taken to be ( ; 1) for and (1; n] for s. For the case n = 1000 and = 0:2 we obtain the following graph:In Figure 2 the graph of f ( ; s) all lies above the zero plane for all values of s 2 (1; n] and of 2 ( ; 1). Summing up, whenever > we found that u i (p e ) > u i fig for s 1; we thus conclude that whenever > then p e is a CCE.
Proposition 3 If >
there exists no CCE.
Proof 12 We again proceed by numerical simulations and evaluate the function f i ( ; n) min f(u i (p e ) u i (fig)) ; 0g
for an arbitrary player i 2 N and a …xed value of . The domains are taken to be (0; 1) for and [1; 10000] for n. Figure 3 depicts the graph off i ( ; n) for the case = 0:5.It is evident from Figure 3 (and from numerical evaluations around the point = 0:5) that for any value of n in the selected range, u i (p e ) < u i (fig) for the whole range of values of < . We thus conclude that for such values there is no CCE.
The above results can be usefully summarized by plotting the value of the di¤erence [u i (p e ) u i fig] as a function of the parameter for …xed values of ; n and for s = 1.
